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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
A'r'I'ORNEYs-DrsoBEDIENCF; OF ORDER oF SusPF;NSlON-WHA'I.' Acrs CoNs'l.'1-
'l.'U'l.'S.-Defendants had been su~pended from practice "in all the courts of 
this state" for one y~r. During suspension they had continued to maintain 
a law office with the usual signs on the doors and windows, used envelopes 
and stationery with their names printed thereon as Attorneys at Law, and 
permitted their names to be inserted as attorneys at law in telephone and 
city directories. Defendant M had caused the preparation of a complaint, 
affidavit, and bond in attachment under his direction and had them fil~d in 
a suit in the District Court by one K, a licensed attorney, and had repre-
sented A, administrator of an estate, before the Probate Court. Defendant 
W drew up a mortgage, charged a fee therefor, examined abstracts of title, 
passed upon them, and appeared at a hearing before the State Engineers, 
there examining witnesses and interposing objections to ·avidence. Held, 
that these acts constituted contempt of court; that the act of M in appearing 
before the Probate Court alone constituted a contempt of court. State v. 
Marro1i; Same v. Wood (N. Mex. 1917), 167 Pac. 9. 
The cases of fa re Duncan (1909), 83 S. C. 186, 18 Ann. Cas. 657, 65 S. E. 
210, ·24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 750; State v. Richardson, (1910), 125 La. 644, 51 So. 
673; and fa re Lizotte (19u), 32 R. I. 386, 79 Atl. 96o, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
794, seem to be the only other reported cases which have been decided on 
this qu~stion. They are all in accord with the principal case. In State v. 
Richardso11, supra, and 'l1i re Lizotte, supra, the acts held to constitute con-
tempt were almost identical with those in the principal case. The main de-
fense in these cases have been that the effect of an order of suspension was 
only to deprive an attorney of such rights and powers as the court had 
conferred upon him; that since a layman could have done the acts alleged 
the defendant has not violated the order of the court. There are several 
dicta which seems to support this argument. See State v. Swan (1899), 6o 
Kans, 461, 56 Pac. 750; Danforth v. Egan (1909), 23 S. Dak. 43, n9 N. W. 
1021, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 418. See also the vigorous dissent 
in the principal case. The courts, however, in the above cases have met this 
argument by saying that in holding himself out as an attorney at law the 
defendant was holding himself out as an officer of tha court, which the 
court's order of suspension had expressly declared he no longer was. In 
the principal case M was held guilty of .contempt of court in appearing be-
fore the probate court under a statute construed to give the court power 
to extend its order to include practice before these inferior courts. Th~ point 
is expressly decided without reference to a statute in In re Duncan, supra. 
The fact that his act is appearance in an inferior court instead of advising 
clients in an office as an attorney would seem not to justify a distinction, 
since in both cases the defendant has acted not as a layman but as an officer 
of the court. Since the defendant's contempt· of court consists in holding 
himself out as an attorney at law the cases seem to involve the same prin-
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ciple as in such cases as fo 1·e Bailey (1915), 50 Mont. 365, 146 Pac. 1101, 
Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 11g8, in which an unlicensed person was held guilty of 
contempt of court in holding himself out as an attorney at law. 
BANKRUPTCY-PREFiiRENCE-M:eANING OF "INSOLV!;NT."-In an action in a 
state court by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover for the estate a preferential 
transfer, the court refused an instruction requested by plaintiff that if de-
fendant "was not able to pay its debts in due course of business it would be 
deemed insolvent." Held, error to refuse such instruction. Simpson v. 
Western Hardware & Metal Co. (Wash. 1917), 167 Pac. 113. 
Section I, Cl. 15, of the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r provides that "A person shall 
be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this act whenever the aggregate 
of his property * * * shall not, at a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to 
pay his debts." Section 6oa provides that "A person shall be deemed to have 
given a preference if, being insolvent, he has, * * * made a transfer," etc: 
Under Sec. 6ob such preferential transfers may, under certain conditions, be 
recovered back by the trustee, by action in a federal or state court. It was 
in such a proceeding that the court in the principal case held the meaning 
of "insolvent" should be determined according to state law rather than by the 
BANKRUPTCY Ac:r. No authority is cited, and probably none could be found 
supporting such vfaw. In view of the fact that the whole proceeding was 
based on the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r, the trustee deriving all of his powers there-
from, and preferential payments being recoverable by him solely because of 
the Act, it would seem almost too clear for argument that the lower court 
was right. In Cra11cer & Co. v. Wade, 26 Oki. 757, 25 Am. Bankr. R. 88o, 
where the action was the same as in the principal case the court said that 
the definition of "insolvency" as fixed by the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r "must be 
strictly adhered to." And in Smnmerdlle v. Stockton Milling Co., 142 Cal. 529, 
where the question was whether a mortgage was an unlawful preference 
under the BANKRUPTCY Ac:r, the court applied the definition of insolvency 
therein, although the other meaning had been adopted in earlier cases not 
involving the Ac:r of 18g8. fo re Ramazzina, uo Cal. 488. Section 3a(4) 
declares an act of bankruptcy to have been committed if "because of in-
solvency a receiver or trustee has been put in charge of his property under 
th-a laws of a state * * * " There would seem to be much more excuse 
for following the rule of the state court as to what amounts to insolvency 
in cases arising under this provision than in cases' like the principal case. It 
has been generally considered, however, that the definition in the Ac:r is to 
control such cases. Maplecroft Mills v. Childs, 226 Fed. 415. See comment 
in 14 MICH. L. Rm. 338. 
CARR!1'RS-!NT1'RSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION-SCOPE OF ORDER R!lGULAT-
ING INTRASTATE RATES.-An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
directed certain express companies to remove an existing, discrimination 
against interstate commerce by ceasing to charge higher rates between Sioux 
City, Iowa, and South Dakota points than for substantially equal distances 
between such South Dakota points and five named South Dakota cities. The 
order undertook to give to the carriers a discretion as to the method to be 
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employed and as to the territory to which it should apply, but intimated 
that the desired result might best be obtained by raising intrastate rates. 
The express companies, disregarding the ord~rs and regulations of the State 
Board of Railroad Commissioners, raised their intrastate rates between the 
five named South Dakota cities and points in every part of the state. Held, 
the Commission's order can serve as a justification for disregarding a regula-
tion issued under state authority only to the extent n~cessary to remove dis-
crimination in definite competitive territory. American Express Co. et al v. 
State of South Dakota (1917), 37 Sup. Ct. 056. 
In reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, reported 
in P. U. R. l917C, 471, 161 N. W. 132, Justice BRANDEIS briefly reaffirms the 
power of Congress to control intrastate charges of an interstate carrier 
to the extent necessary to prevent injurious discrimination against interstate 
commerce, the doctrine laid down in the 1\limiesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 
352, 57 L. Ed. l5II, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1~51; and also reaffirms the inten-
tion of Congress to delegate this power to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion by the INTERSTATE CoMMtRCS Ar:r, 24 Stat. 379, c. 104, U. S. Comp. St 
1901, p. 3154, and 'the amendments thereto, the question decided in the Shreve-
port case, Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 
833, 58 L. Ed. 1341. Although these two decisions have been subjected to con-
siderable adverse criticism as departures from authoritative precedents, for a 
•scholarly treatment of which, see 28 HARVARD LAW RsVIEW, p. 34, the court in 
the instant case holds the doctrines of those cases as established beyond con-
troversy. The same position is upheld in St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. et al. 
v. State (Ark.), 197 S. W. 1. But another, and perhaps more important ques-
tion, was raised for decision in the instant case by the action of the carriers 
in raising their rates from the five specified cities to points in all parts of 
the state, contrary to the orders of the state board. In the Shreveport case, 
supra, the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 23 I. C. C. 231, 
was definite as to the points to which the rates were to be changed; but in 
the present case the order it~lf, 39 I. C. C. 703, specified neither the ter-
ritory to be affected nor the rates to be put into effect. The court holds, 
that in a case like the present where_ Federal and state authorities conflict, 
the order must definitely define and limit the territory in which the discrimina-
tion is found to exist, for it is only within that sphere that the power of the 
Federal Commission dominates state regulation. The court here finds the 
order sufficiently definite when read in conjunction with the report annexed 
thereto, and that the order of the commission did not apply to rate advances 
other than those in competitive territory in the southeast-em part of South 
Dakota. The question of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
to authorize the raising of all intrastate rates contrary to state regulations, 
and not merely those in competitive territory, is now being argued by cer-
tain Illinois ~ilroads before the Commission. 
CoNs'tI'rU'tloNAL LAw-CoNsCRIPT.IoN Act oF MAY 18, 1917, VAI,m1n oF.-
Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to commit an offense against the 
United States in unlawfully and wilfully aiding, abetting,- and procuring per-
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sons to violate the CONSCRIPTION Ac:r. He filed a motion to quash. Held, 
motion should be denied. U.S. v. Sugar, et al. (Dist. Ct. 1917), 243 Fed. 423. 
!n the ·principal case defendant attacked the constitutionality of the CoN-
SCRIPTION Ac:r, but the court held the act not unconstitutional, because: (I) 
It is not contrary to the provision of the THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT prohibiting 
involuntary servitude. See fo re Dassler, 35 Kans. 678. (2) Even though it 
may constitute class legislation, there is no provision in the FEDERAI. CON-
STITUTION prohibiting Congress from passing laws of that character, the in-
hibition of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT is directed against state legislation 
only. See U.S. v. Adair, 152 Fed. 737; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 
107. (3) It does not infringe upon the power of review lodged in the courts 
because the power given to the boards to pass upon exemption claims has its 
source in the CONSTITUTION, in the fourteenth subdivision of Sec. 8, Art. l. 
See E% Parte Dickey, 204 Fed. 322; The Grapeshot, 76 U. S. 129. (4) The 
act is an exercise of power conferred upon Congress by the FEDERAI. CON-
STITUTION. A national government may preserve its existence by war and it 
is unnecessary to rely on implication, for the CONSTITUTION expressly pro-
vides that Congress shall have power to declare war-to raise armies and 
provide a navy and to make rules regulating same. The power to conscript 
results from these combined expressed powers. Fairbank v. U. S., 181 U. S. 
283; Allen v. Colb::,•, 47 N. H. 544;; Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238. (5) The 
Ac:r does not call out the militia for a purpose not authorized by the FED-
ER.Ar, CONSTITUTION, and even if it did, it could only be questioned by a mem-
ber of the National Guard. Many cases of similar nature arose during the 
Civil War in the Confederacy, •whose Constitution relating to the military 
power had been adopted without change from the CONSTITUTION of the United 
States, and without an exception the provisions were held constitutional. 
E% Parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429; E% Parte Bolling, 39 Ala. 6og; Tarble's Case, 13 
Wallace 397; Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347. The power of coercing the citizen 
to render military service is not inconsistent with liberty but is essential to 
its preservation. Burroughs v. Peyto1i, 57 Va. 470. In E% Parte Coupland, 
26 Texas 387, Mr. Justice BEI.r. dissented as to the constitutionality of the 
CONSCRIPT LAW for th~ reason that the power is· not expressly given in the 
Constitution and because it was not resorted to in the Revolutionary War, 
the War of 1812, nor in the War with Mexico. The answer is that it was 
not needed then, and if the question had arisen, there is good reason for be-
lieving that it would have been held constitutional in view of the theories 
expressed by the foremost statesmen of the times. See M'Culloch ·v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 3I6; THE FEDERALIST (9o-g8); President MONROE, Vol. 7-
NaES REGISTER, 137, 294, 2 Ed. 281. In a recent ca"se, Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U. S. II, 1905, th~ court said: "The liberty secured by the 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT consists in the right of a person 'to live and work 
where he will.' Allgeyer v. Lo11isiana, 165 U. S. 578; and he may be com-
pelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal 
wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convic-
tions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country." 
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Co~v1ms10N-Eu:crR1CITY-WArvER OF ToRT.-P occupied an upper floor 
in a building, the basement of which was occupied by D. Whether one was 
tenant to the other, or they were tenants of a common landlord, or other-
wise, does not appear. In the basement was a large electric light which for 
several years drew current through a meter on P's premises, for which, pre-
sumably, P paid the producer of the electricity. Apparently neither party 
k"llew of the connection of the lamp with ihe meter during any of the period 
in question. P now sues D for the value of the electricity thus consumed at 
his expense. The pleadings are not set forth but we are told that P's counsel 
"properly characterized the action 'as a suit upon an implied contract." Held, 
that a demurrer to the petition was properly sustained. Kirkpatrick Co. v. 
Hamlet, (Ct of App. of Ga. 1917), 93 S. E. 226. 
The court says, "The present action is a suit upon an implied contract 
for the value of personal property wrongfully taken and converted to the use 
of the defendant. * * * "Where one wrongfully takes the personal property 
of another and converts the same to his own use in some other manner than 
by a sale and does not receive any money therefor, the owner * * * cannot 
waive the tort and sue upon an implied contract." 
The cases cited by the court are all cases where defendant was clearly 
guilty of a conversion, upon the plaintiff's theory of the facts. '\Then we 
are asked to pass from this class of cases to others where there is no tort, 
we should pause to make some important observations. First, given a tort 
remedy, it is not a matter of great importance whether we give or refuse 
a concurrent remedy of a quasi-contractual nature, whereas, if there is no 
tort remedy, the question as to the quasi-contractual remedy is vital. Sec-
ondly, the only reason given for these rulings is the ancient objection to 
concurrent remedies, appearing in the earliest of the Georgia cases in these 
words, "Unless trover be required in such a case as this, there can be none 
in which it ought to be required. We are not prepared to say that there 
are not some cases in which the law requires trover." (Spencer v. Hewett, 
20 Ga:¢). In that case, the court distinguished one of the authorities cited 
for the plaintiff by saying, "in that case the facts were such that unless an 
action ex contractu would lie, none would lie." It thus appears that the 
principal case is a decision, not, as might at first appear, mere dictum, that 
D was guilty of a tort. And, if any tort was committed, it would seem to 
have been, as suggested by the court, a conversion. This is, of course, a 
somewhat novel conversiqn. Electricity is not, so the physicists tell us, mat-
ter, but force; which means that the case is from the physical point of view 
more nearly analogous to making one's neighbor work for him under the 
point of a gun, than to taking or detaining his goods. But, to any such 
objection, it would seem to be a sufficient answer that for all the practical 
purposes with which the iaw is concerned, electricity is like liquids and 
gases in vessels and pipes ; that in all its commercial aspects it is goods. And, 
if authority is demanded, we find an equal extension of the original concep-
tion of conversion in the cases holding that shares of stock, as distinguished 
from certificates of stock, are the subject of conversion. Payne v. Elliot, 
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54 Cal. 339; Ralston v. Ba1ik of California, 112 Cal. 208; Daggett v. Davis, 
53 Mich. 35; Budd v. Multnomah Co., I2 Ore 27I; Rio Gra11de Co. v. Bums, 
Walker & Co., 82 Tex. 50. 
CoRPORA11:0NS-CARS lli>QUIRED OF CORFORATS DIRSCTORS.-A director of 
a Building and Loan Association, recommended a loan on property already 
incumbered by a mortgage under his control in his personal capacity. He 
made no inquiry in regard to the property and was ignorant that it was the 
same property which was incumbered. An article of the Association stated 
that "No money shall be loaned on property already incumbered." There 
was no charge, nor proof of fraud, embezzlement, or wilful misconduct nor 
breach of trust for the beenfit of the director, nor a mistake of judgment but 
mere inattention and negligence which made possible fraud perpetrated by 
another officer of the Association. Held, that the director was guilty of such 
negligence as renders him liable for the loss which was occasioned to the 
Association by the reason of his failure to act. Four Corners Building & 
Lomi Association of Newark v. Schwarzwaelder (N. J. Chancery, I9I7), 
IOI Atl. 564. 
This case broadens the scope "of the existing law in New Jersey which 
has been e>..-pressed in the cases of Williams v. McKay, 46 N. J. Eq. 25 and in 
Gerhard v. Welsh, 8o N. J. Eq. 203; that the duty of bringing to their office 
(that of a· director), ordinary skill and vigilance was none the less exacting 
though they were unpaid servants. They became engaged to carry on the 
business of the corporation in the same way that men of common prudence 
and skill conduct a similar business for themselves. Honesty of intention 
will not excuse imprudence or indifference. The instant case goes further 
and holds that apart from any wilful act, a director is held responsible when 
he performs an act which under all the circumstances he is bound not to 
perform or that he does not perform an act which under all the circum-
stances he is bound to perform. The United States Supreme Court has given 
great lee-way to the directors and has held that they are liable only for 
fraud or for such gross negligence as amounts to fraud. Briggs v. Spaulding, 
I4I U. S. I32. Pennsylvania courts have gone further, and have held that 
where the directors have not sought to make any personal profit there is a 
strong presumption negativing negligence. They are likened unto a gra-
tuitous bailee who is liable only for failure to exercise a slight degree of 
care. Swentzel v. Penn. Bank, I47 Pa. St. 140. The principal case expresses 
the best line of authority and states the rule to be that such officers must 
exercise ordinary care, i. e., that care which every man of common prudence 
and discretion takes of his own concerns. This decision is of great interest 
to the investor and will act as a stimulus to the market. Cf. Ba1ik v. Hill, 
5~ Me. 385; Marshall v. Bank, 85 Va. 676; Warren v. Robison, I9 Ut. 289. 
CORPORATIONS-MAJORITY OF STOCKHOLDERS ALISN ENJ~MISS LIVING IN 
ENEMY COUNTRY-RIGHT OF CORPORATION TO Sm:.-In an action by the plain-
tiff, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey, with 
94% of its capital stock owned by a German corporation and a German citizen 
resident in Germany, defendant filed a motion to stay the plaintiff from fur-
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ther prosecuting the action, until the determination of the present war be-
tween Germany and the United States, on the ground that the plaintiff was 
an alien enemy. Held, that the motion should be denied because the cor-
porate body is a distinct entity from the alien owners of its stock, and con-
sequently, though of foreign ownership, it is not to be precluded from access 
to our courts during the period of the war. Fritz Schulz, Jr. Co. v. Raimes 
& Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 567. 
It has become a settled doctrine of corporation law that a corporation, 
for the purposes for which it may be considered a citizen, resident, or inhab-
itant (and one of those purposes is to sue and be sued in the courts) is a 
citizen, resident, or inhabitant of the country or state by or under whose 
laws it was created or organized, and it can make no difference whatever, 
in the application of this doctrine, that the members ·or stockholders are citi-
zens and residents of some other country or state than that to whose laws 
the corporation owes its existence. See: Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letsoii, 2 
How. 497; Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 How. 314; St. Louis & San 
Francisco Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545; Queen v. Arnaud, 16 Law J. Q. B. 
50. The court, in the principal case, in reaching the decision that it did, 
merely confirmed the established doctrine of the law that a corporation is 
an entity separate and apart from its corporators, and its domicile is as a 
matter of law within the state of its creation, and the domicile or character 
of its corporators does not affect the domicile or character of the corpora-
tion. The result reached by the New York Supreme Court is, however, in 
conflict with the result reached by the English House of Lords in the case 
of Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., (1916), 2 A. C. 307, 
where it was held, on facts practically identical with those in the principal 
case, that the corporation would be denied the right to appeal to the courts, 
overruling the decision of the Court of Appeal (1915), (1 K. B. 893) and 
reaching a conclusion different from that reached in the case of Amorduct 
Mfg. Co. v. Defries & Co., 31 T. L. R 69, which decisions are in accord 
with the finding and reasoning in the instant case. But it does not follow 
that the result of the decision of the House of Lords is to overthrow what 
has been stated as an established" doctrine. That decision is not based on 
any argument that that doctrine is unsound, but it is based upon the fact 
that the Lords were convinced that the Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. was 
in fact adhering to, taking instructions from, or acting under the control of, 
enemies in the enemy country, so as to impose an enemy character on the 
company itself, and thus prevent it from appealing to the courts. In the 
principal case, the court came to the conclusion that the Fritz Schulz Co. 
was in the control of residents of this country, and therefore did not feel con-
strained to impose an enemy character upon it, and deprive it of its right to 
appeal to the courts. See also Speidel v. Barstow Co., 243 Fed. 621. It may 
be pertinent to observe that the city of New York has never been bombed by 
Zeppelins. 
Covr;NANTS-:Rl>STRICT10Ns-Uss FOR :Rl>SIDSNct PURPosss ONLY.-Cove-
nant restricting the use of premises "for residence purposes only." Held, 
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not violated by occupancy of residence property by twelve or fifteen members 
of a Catholic Sisterhood who held religious services daily with the assistance 
of a priest in a small private chapel fitted with an altar. Hunter Tract Im-
provement Co. et al. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Nisqually, et al., 
(Wash., 1917), 167 Pac. 100. 
The court said that the name given to the house itself was immaterial as 
the restriction is not against names but purposes. Smith v. Water Works Co., 
I04 Ala. 315. Scott Co. et al. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop for Diocese of 
Oregon. 83 -Oregon 97, 163 Pac. 88, held in accord with the principal case 
that a building occupied by nuns might be fairly termed a residence or dwell-
ing, and if the other conditions are complied with, it makes no difference 
how large the dwelling is or how many people occupy it. The word residence 
is equivalent to residential and is used in contradistinction to business. Hunt 
v. Held, 90 Ohio St. 280, Am. Ann. Cas. 1916 C, rn51. Generally a covenant 
that property shall be used "for residence purposes only" is held not to pro-
hibit its use as an apartment house or flat. McMurtry v. Phillips Investment 
Co., 103 Ky. 3o8, 40 L. R. A. 489; Tillotson v. Gregory, 151 Mich., 128, u4 
N. W. 1025; Re Robertson & Defoe, 25 Ont. L. Rep. 286, 30 Ont. W. N. 31. 
In McMiirtry v. Phillips, supra, a covenant to use property for residence pur-
poses only was not violated by erection of an apartment house for several 
families separate from each other in a general way but with a large dining 
room in the basement to be used in common by all tenants when they so 
desired,' a common laundry room, and a common store room. But in Burton 
v. Stapeley, 4 Ohio N. P. N. S. 65, the court interpreted residence to mean 
private dwelling. The judgment of the court was affirmed in 74 Oh. St. 461, 
78 N. E. u20. This however is contrary to the generally accepted view and 
was disapproved by the Ohio Supreme Court later in Hunt v. Held, 90 Ohio 
St. 28o, Am. Ann. Cas. 1916 C, rn51. 
DEATH-ACTION U~rn!lll- SPRVIV4 ACT-NEGLIGENCE oF BENEFICIARY AS A 
DEFENSE-NEGLIGENCE OF BENEFICIARy's HUSBAND AS A DEFENSE.-Deceased's 
father obtained employment for him with defendant by fraudulently misrep-
resenting his age as seventeen instead of sixteen. The father, as personal 
representative, seeks to recover for himself and wife under the federal 
RAILROAD EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT of April 22, 1go8 and its amendment of 
April 5, 1910 on the death of his son caused by injuries sustained while in 
defendant's employ. Held, that the negligence of the father prevented recov-
ery for either parent. Crevelli v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (Wash. 
1917), 167 Pac. 66 .. 
The negligel).t beneficiary is easily seen beneath the thin disguise of the 
personal representative required by the statute to sue, Penny v. New Orleans, 
etc., R. Co. (I914), 135 La. g621 66 So. 313; and the rule in regard to con-
tributory negligence gives the result reached without more reasoning. TIF-
FANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, 2d Ed., Sec. 7I; J. H. W1GMORE, 2 Ill. L. 
Rev. 487. A distinction, however, was made between the statutes giving the 
benefit of the recovery to the deceased's estate, Love v. Detroit, etc. Ry. Co., 
170 Mich. 1, 135 N. W. g63, and those naming beneficiaries. This distinction 
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leads to the same result, inasmuch as the act has been uniformly construed as 
creating a new right of action for the beneficiaries. American R. R. v. Did-
ricksen, 227 U.S. r45, r49; Wellman v. Bethea (1917), 243 Fed. 222, 225. Even 
defeating the wife's recovery has some justification on account of Washing-
ton statutes which would make it impossible for the court to keep the hus-
band from sharing it. This fact answers the strongest arguments against 
Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co. (19r5), 248 Pa. St. 503, 94 At!. 269, L. R. A. 
1915 E. 781. But there is an admitted conflict. 29 HARV. L. REv. 99; 25 YALE 
I,. J. 244; 15 CoL. L. RI<:v. 629. 
EvIDENc:E-Vn:w IN A FOREIGN STATE.-Libel for divorce on the ground 
of adultery. A general statute authorized the court, in its discretion, to order 
a view. The judge, without exception of either party, ordered a view in 
!lfassachusetts of premises where the acts of adultery were alleged to have 
been committed. The judge took the view in the presence of both parties. 
Held, that it was not error to order a view in a foreign state. Carpenter v. 
Carpenter (N. H. I917), IOI At!. 628. 
Only one other case has been found in which the question of the propriety 
of a view outside of the state was raised. In this case, State v. Hawthorn, 
134 La. 979, 64 So. 873, the court held that it was not error to refuse a view 
in a foreign state, on the ground that such a view would be beyond the j uris-
diction of the court. The instant case held that no question of jurisdiction 
was involved but only one of procedure. A resort to analogy seems to sus-
tain the court. Statutes in many states provide personal service of process 
may be made on a person in a foreign state, in some cases through the sheriff 
of the court issuing the writ; in others, through the sheriff of the county 
where the service is made. NEBR. CODE, Section 81; KANS. CoDE, Section 76. 
This service is effective only when the proceeding is iii rem. It is not em-
ployed to give the court jurisdiction. That the court has because the res 
is before it. The service is nothing but a procedural step to apprise the de-
fendant of the proceedings in the other state as a suitable foundation for a 
judgment against property already within the jurisdiction of the court. Pen-
iioyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. Similarly, the view is solely a procedural act to 
facilitate proceedings over which the court has already obtained jurisdiction. 
Another analogy is found in the case of statutes which provide for the ap-
pointment of commissioners in foreign states who are authorized to take 
depositions. These are given the same effect as though taken within the 
state. This again is an act of procedure without the state which is an aid 
to the legal proceedings within the state. 
GIFTS-CAUSA l\foRTIS-CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY OF AUTOMOBILE.-Deceas-
ed, on his deathbed, maqe the following statement to his fiancee who had min-
istered to his wants during his illness, "I give you my automobile, May." 
The lady took charge and had possession of the machine for several days 
thereafter until it was seized by the administrator of the deceased's estate. 
Held, the subsequent acceptance and taking of dominion by the donee was 
sufficient to satisfy the rule of law requiring delivery to sustain a gift cdusa 
mortis. Mackenzie v. Steeves (Wash. 19I7), 167 Pac. 50. 
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The necessity for a delivery in cases of gifts mortis causa has been pro-
ductive of much trouble for the courts. The ease with which such gifts, un-
limited in amount, may be established, has caused the courts to look upon 
them with disfavor, and has resulted in many of them adhering to the rule 
laid down in the early case of Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, requiring actual 
delivery of the thing itself, if capable of delivery, and some symbolical act 
equivalent to such delivery in case the subject of the gift was incapable of 
manual tradition. Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 231, 17 At!. 63, 3 L. R A. 230; 
Keepers v. Fidelity Title, etc. Co., 56 N. J. Law 302, 28 At!. 585, 23 L. R A. 
184; Apaclzc State Bank v. Daniels, 32 Okla. 121, 121 Pac. 237, Ann. Cas. 
1914.A, 520. As the court in Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, puts it, "It is 
far better that occasionally a gift of this kind should fail than that the rules 
of law be so relaxed as to encourage fraud and perjury." Other courts, 
acting ori the principle that the law favors the disposition of property by 
the owner before death, hold that the donor's intention, when clearly ascer-
tained, is not to be thwarted by a narrow and illiberal construction of what 
may have been intended for and deemed by him sufficient delivery. Ellis v. 
Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178; Teague v. Abbot, 51 Ind. App. 604, 
100 N. E. 27; Waite v. Grnbbe, 43 Ore. 4o6, 73 Pac. 2o6, 99 Am. St. Rep. 
~64 Most of the cases along this line, however, contain some element of 
symbolical delivery, as the handing over of a key, or, as in Teague v. Abbot, 
the delivery of the combination of a safe, and are not precisely in point as 
far as the instant case is concerned. In iVaite v. Grnbbe, supra, on which 
the court in the present case relies considerably, a gift causa mortis of buried 
money by the donor to his daughter was sustained by her acceptance at the 
time her father showed her the location of the money, and her acquisition 
after her father's death, the intent of the donor answering for the act of 
delivery. An examination of the cases cited' in support of that holding re-
veals only one, or two at the most, in which the court was called upon to 
decide that the donor's intent plus acceptance and possession by the donee 
would dispense with the act of delivery. In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 55 Vt 325, 
the donor announced in the presence of his family that he gave his carriage 
to his daughter. She subsequently took possession and used the vehicle, and 
this was held sufficient to sustain the gift That case was not, however, a case 
of a gift causa mortis, but one inter vivos. It rather looks as though the 
courts have gone to unwarranted lengths in seeking to carry out the donor's 
intentions. 
LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND.-Plain-
tiff leased a creamery to X, who covenanted that he would operate the same 
as an "independent" creamery. X assigned the term fo defendant who oper-
ated the creamery in combination with others, and plaintiff sued for damages. 
Held, that the covenant ran with the land and bound defendant. First Nat'l 
Bank v. Klock Produce Co. (Ore. 1917), 166 Pac. 955. 
The decision in this case is in accord with the authorities, which hold 
that, there being the requisite privity of estate, a covenant in a lease that 
restricts or abridges some of the rights, privileges, or powers of the cove-
50 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
nantor as owner of the estate, will bind his assignee. It is wholly unneces-
sary to inquire in the case whether or not the motive of the lessor in insert-
ing in the lease this covenant was personal and independent of his owner-
ship of the reversionary estate, inasmuch as the question here is not whether 
the benefit would have run had he assigned the ·reversion. According to 
what seems to be the better rule, a covenant will run with the land if it is 
an inseparable limitation on that land; and if the lessor chooses to part with 
the land subject only to a restriction as to its use, his motive in creating that 
restriction sliould make no difference in an action against the assignee of the 
covenantor. 12 MICH. L. R.£v. 639. In the English cases where the lessee 
of a "tied house,'' covenants to buy his beers and ales only of his lessor, it 
has been held that such covenant binds the assignee of the lessee. Clegg v. 
Hands, 44 Ch. D. 503; White v. Soiithend Hotel Co. (I8g7), I Ch. 767. A 
covenant of this nature affects the estate,....:....Or in the formula of SpenceYs 
Case, "touches or concerns the thing demised"--only in the method o'f oper-
ating the business. In this respect such a covenant is similar to that of the 
principal case. In Congleton v. Pattison, IO East I30, where the lessee of a 
mill covenanted to employ only such persons as could give the lessor a cer-
tificate of settle!Jlent, it was held that such a covenant did not run with the 
land. The logic of this case has been questioned by respectable authority, 
it being contended that "a covenant not to employ a particular class of laborers· 
is a limitation upon the privileges of the lessee, as such, just as much as a 
covenant not to make or sell a particular article." I2 MICH. L. REv. 639, 
quoted supra. A covenant in a lease of a paper mill that the lessee would not 
make a certain kind of paper which the lessee was engaged in manufacturing 
elsewhere was held to bind the asignee of the lessee. American Strawboard 
Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. 6I9 (I897); and a covenant by a lessee 
that if he sold liquor on the premises the business should be conducted 
strictly according to law was similarly passed upon. Crowe v. Riley, 63 Oh. 
St. l. In the instant case when the lessee acquired the premises he acquired 
certain rights and privileges, one of which, had he not covenanted as he did, 
being the right to run the business independently or in combination. But 
he accepted the premises restricted by a covenant limiting this right, and 
such covenant was'properly held to run with the land. 
LANDLORD AND TuNANT-IMPLIED COVENANT OF FrTNJ>SS OF TuNANT.-Ac-
tion for breach of warranty, for fraudulent representation and concealment. 
Defendant engaged furnislied rooms of the plaintiff for herself and her· 
father, who was then afflicted with leprosy. Three months later the defend-
ant's father died. As a result of the occupation the rooms were infected 
with leprosy to the plaintiff's damage. At the time defendant engaged the 
rooms, she had no knowledge that her father suffered with the disease. Held, 
PJaintiff could not recover. Humphreys v. Miller (I917), 2 K. B. 122. 
The plaintiff, in the instant case, contended that there is an implied cove-
nant that the tenant is a fit and proper person, and free from infectious dis-
ease. The court, without giving any reasons, flatly refused to recognize this 
contention. There seems to be no decision by any court of last resort that 
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there is such a covenant. The rule is well settled, both in this country and in 
England, that, in the absence of fraud and concealment, a lease of unfur-
nished premises raises no implied covenant by the landlord that they are 
tenantable and fit for immediate occupation. Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 
68. A lease of furnished premises raises such an implied covenant according 
to the English cases. Smith v. Marrable, II M. & W. 5; Wilson v. Finch-
Hatton, 46 L. J. Ex. 489, 2 Ex. D. 336, while in this country there is a split 
of authorities. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N. E. 286; Davis v. 
George, 67 N. H. 393, 39 Atl. 979. The reason for the distinction is, that 
in the case of the furnished premises it is generally understood that the ten-
ant intends immediate occupation of premises, ready for use, whereas-in the 
other case the tenant does not intend occupation until he has examined the 
premises and made them tenantable according to his own desires. UNDER-
HILL, L. AND T., § 478. It would seem that the infection of the premises, at 
the commencement of the tenancy, by a disease dangerous to an occupant 
would constitute a breach of the implied covenant that they are tenantable. 
In many instances, it would be just as difficult for the landlord to discover 
that the tenant has the infectious disease, as for the tenant to discover the 
infection of the premises. There would seem, then, to be some reason for 
implying such a covenant on the part of the lessee. Where the element of 
knowledge, false representation and concealment enters, the situation is 
clearer. The landlord is held liable if he has knowledge of the infection of 
the premises and fails to reveal the fact. UNDSRHILI., L. AND T., § 482. 
If the converse is the situation, that is, if the tenant has knowledge of his 
infectious disease and is guilty of fraudulent concealment or false represen-
tation, he too should be held liable. While no court of last resort has ex-
pressly so held, Gwymie v. Clarke, decided recently in the Monaghan County 
Court (Ireland), referred to in 58 Ohio Law Bulletin, 246, adopts this view, 
as does also, by inference, the court in the case of Farrar v. Peterson & Co., 
72 Wash. 482, 130 Pac. 753. 
MASTER AND SERVANT-WRONGFUL DISCHARGr:-DoCTRIN:e OF "CoNS'tRUC-
TIVr: SttVIcr:."-Defendant employed plaintiff for a term of one year at an 
agreed salary. Shortly after plaintiff had entered upon the performance of 
the services under the contract, defendant wrongfully discharged him. Plain-
tiff recovered judgment for the first instalments, and now, after the expira-
tion of the contract period, sues for the remaining instalments. Defendant 
pleads the judgment in the first suit as a bar to plaintiff's action. Held, the 
judgment on the previous instalments was no bar to the action, the doctrine 
of "constructive service" still prevailing in Georgia. Edison v. Dundee 
Woolen Mills, (Ga. App. 1917), 93 S. E. 324-
Whatever view the court may have held concerning the wisdom of allow-
ing a plaintiff thus wrongfully discharged to bring separate actions for the 
successive instalments as they should become due, no other disposition was 
possible for this case, since it was controlled by the prior decisions of the 
Georgia Supreme Court. Moore v. Kelly & Jones Co., III Ga. 371, 36 S. E. 
8o2; Bluii v. Holitzer, 53 Ga. 82; Isaacs v. Davies, 68 Ga. 16g. A few other 
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jurisdictions are still in accord with these decisions. Fowler v. Armour, 24 
Ala. 194; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. St. Rep. 8; Marx v. Miller, 
134 Ala. 347, 32 So. 765; Smith v. Lumber Co., 142 N. C. 26; Stradley v. 
Bath Portland Cement Co., 228 Pa. St. 108; Allen v. biternational Textbook 
Co., 201 Pa. St. 579, 51 Atl. 323. The doctrine of ~'constructive service" had 
its origin in a nisi prius decision in England early in the nineteenth century. 
Ganden v. Pontigny, 4 Campb. 375. The effect of the doctrine is to allow 
a servant, employed for a definite period at a stipulated wage, and wrong-
fully discharged before the expiration of the term, to bring suit for each in-
stalment as it becomes due, as though the contract were still continuing. This 
holding is based on the fiction that the servant is constructively ready to 
perform the services, and that when the time comes for the payment of each 
instalment there is a partial breach of the contract. The doctrine has been 
repudiated in England, Fewings v. Tisdal, 1 Exch. 295; Archard v. Hornor, 
3 C. & P. 349, 14 E. C. L. 604; Elderton v. Emmens, 6 C. B. 160, 60 E. C. L. 
160, affirmed 13 C. B. 495, 76 E. C. L. 495, 4 H. L. Cas. 624; and in a majority 
of the American jurisdictions. James v. Allen Co., 44 Oh. St. 226, 6 N. E. 
246, 58 Am. Rep. 821; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285 
(though the case did not tum alone on this point); Olmstead v. Bach, 78 
Md. 132, 27 Atl. 501, 22 L. R A. 74, 44 Am. St. R 273; Carmean v. North 
Americaii Transportation, etc. Co., 45 Wash. 446, 88 Pac. 834 122 Am. St. 
Rep. 930, 13 Ann. Cas. no and note, 8 L. R A. (N. S.) 595. According to 
the prevailing view, the servant thus wrongfully discharged cannot, ~ven by 
waiting until the expiration of the contract term, bring his action for wages 
as such. Instead, his suit is for damages as for the breach of an ordinary 
contract, and a judgment in one suit, although covering only a part of the 
contract period, will be a bar to further actions. This holding goes on the 
theory that there is only one breach, and that a single cause of action should 
not be split into several suits. In this one suit, however, whether brought 
before or after the expiration of the contract period, the plaintiff may, by 
the later authorities, recover full damages for the loss caused by the breach 
of the contract. Addis v. Gramophone Co. (1909), A. C. 488, 78 L. J. K B. 
u22, IOI L. T. N. S. 466, 3 British Rul. Cas. g8, 16 Ann. Cas. g8, note; Meade 
v. Doherty, 7 N. B. 195; Steams v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., u2 Mich. 651, 71 
N. W. u8; Cilfter v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95, 39 N. E. 1010; Boland v. Glendale 
Quarry Co., 127 Mo. 520, 30 S. W. 151; Rhoades v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., 
49 W. Va. 494. 55 L. RA. 170, 87 Am. St. Rep. 826, 39 S. E. 209; Wilke v. 
Harrison Bros., 166 Pa. St. 202, 30 Atl. u25; Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 
53 N. E. 181, 54 N. E. 437, 71 Am. St. Rep. 384 This recovery includes pros-
pective damages for the entire period of the contract, rather than merely 
up to the time of the trial, but does not include damages for injured feelings 
or reputation or for the manner of the dismissal. Addis v. Gramophone Co.; 
supra. But where the stipulated term is for life or during ability to perform 
the services the authorities are in confusion as to whether prospective dam-
ages are recoverable. Apparently, if the wronged servant in such a case is 
to secure redress of any effectiveness at all, he must be given speculative 
damages. And who can say how long he will live? It is this injustice in 
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the majority holding which the Minnesota court attacks in McMullan v. Dick-
inson Co., 60 Minn. 156, 62 N. W. 120, 51 Am. St. Rep. 5u, 27 L. R. A. 409· 
The latter court, after showing that the fiction of "constructive service" is 
properly repudiated as a basis of recovery (because of its inconsis~ency with 
the principle that the plaintiff should attempt to mitigate the damages by 
searching for another position), argues that the discharged servant simply 
desires indemnity, and not damages; that it is impossible to estimate fairly 
or accurately the time he would have been able to serve; that there is no 
way to fix the amount necessary to indemnify him, until the time has actually 
passed, so that the amount earned by other employment, if any, can be de-
ducted; that in the meantime he may have no income upon which to liye; 
that the Statute of Limitations probably would force him to bring his action 
before the expiration of the term that he would have been able to serve ; 
and that he should be allowed to bring successive actions at the close of the 
instalment periods. That is, the Minnesota view is to adopt the rule of 
"constructive service" as to the measure of damages while rejecting it as the 
basis of recovery. Unfortunately, the equitable Minnesota rule has not been 
followed elsewhere. See Carmean v. North Americaii Transportation, etc. 
Co., supra. 
PHYSICIANS AND SuRG£0NS-PRAcrICING WITHOUT LICENsr:-SPIRITUALISM. 
-THr: PUBLIC Hr:ALTH LAW prohibited the practice of medicine without a li-
cense, excepting by those who practice according to the religious tenets of any 
church. A member of the Spiritualist Church had an office in which he re-
ceived patients and dispensed drugs and liniments prepared by himself. It 
appeared that he was ordained as a healer of the church. Held, that de-
fendant was not immune, the exemption giving him no authority to heal by 
agencies other than prayer or the practice of religion. People v. Vogelge-
sang (N. Y. 1917), u6 N. E. 977. 
The cases for the most part regard the diagnosis as the test to determine 
whether a practice or treatment is included in the term medicine. State v. 
Smith, 233 Mo. 242. The exception to the statute in the case of one prac-
ticing the religious tenets of any church cannot be used as a shield to a bus-
iness undertaking, and when the accused claims to act as a "divine healer" 
it has been held that it is the nature of defendants business, not the objects 
of the tenets of his church that control. Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, II7 
Pac. 612. In State v. Peters, 87 Kans. 265, 123 Pac. 751, where de.fendant 
claimed to practice ·a religious belief but "diagnosed diseases and treated pa-
tients in a matter-of-fact way by manipulations and rubbing," he was not 
within the exemption of the statute. In the instant cas'e the same applies. "The 
sufferer's mind must be brought into submission to the infinite mind, and in 
this must be the healing," and, continues the opinion, ''While the healer in-
culcates the faith of the church as a method of healing he is immune. When 
he goes beyond that, puts his spiritual agencies aside, and takes up the agencies 
of the flesh, his immunity ceases." The statute is strictly construed ~gainst 
the defendant. Commonwealth v. Delon, 219 Mass. 217, Io6 N. E. 846. But 
the exemption includes every person in the practice of the religious tenets 
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of any church who acts in good faith. People v. Cole, 219 N. Y. 98, 113 
N. E;790. It was said in People v. Cole, supra, where the exemption applied 
to a person practicing Christian Science healing through prayer, that "heal-
ing would seem to be not only the prominent work of the church and its 
members, but the one distinctive belief around which the church organiza-
tion is founded and sustained." It follows from the principal case and the 
other authorities cited that a spiritualist could administer his treatments 
through the means . of the tenets of his religion in so far as they do not 
authorize the use of drugs or extrinsic methods. 
PRoPitRTY-UNPATl!NT&> CoNCl!PTS.-Stein sued for an order enjoining; 
Morris and others from using a certain plan for conducting the business of 
banking and lending money on sectirity, now commonly known as the "Morris 
Plan," which he claimed to have originated and to own. The idea was to 
lend money, in small amounts, to borrowers who should take out an amount 
of stock in the company equal to the amount of their loans. This stock was 
to be held by the company as security for the loan and the borrower was 
to make periodic payments upon the stock This when fully paid for provided 
a means of discharging the loan obligation. Stein alleged that he, as orig-
inator, had communicated this plan in detail to Morris who had put it into 
profitable use for his own purposes. Held, that the plan used by Morris was 
not in fact the same as that admitted to have been suggested to him by 
the .plaintiff, and that, furthermore, the plaintiff's scheme was not itself orig-
inal with him but had long been in operation in that part of Europe from 
which he had emigrated. The court said further that even if Stein had 
originated the Morris plan, "he could not have a property right in such a 
method or idea for conducting business without any physical means or de-
vices for carrying it. out. In other words, he could not put such an id~ 
into operation without it at once escaping his own grasp and becoming the 
property of mankind." Stein v. Morris (Va. 1917), 91 S. E. 177. · 
The case is interesting because of the comparative infrequence of claims-
of ownership in an idea, outside of the l;tatutes giving such ownership. . The 
quoted dictum of tlie case in regard to such ownership at common law is 
quite in accord with precedent. There is undoubtedly property, or, to avoid 
question of definition, a right fo rem, at common liw in certain intangible 
things, such as reputation and the performance of a contract by the promisor 
without malicious interference by a third party. But there is no recognition 
of a right in rem concerning particular concepts emanating from individual 
brains, with the possible exception of an author's right to literary production. 
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, 2303; Gayler v. Wilder, IO How. 477, 502. This is 
on the ground, apparently, that ownership must be predicated upon the pos-
sibility of exclusive possession. "So long as the originator of the naked idea· 
keeps it to himself * * * it is his exclusive property, but it ceases to be his 
own when he permits it to pass from him. Ideas of this sort in their relation 
to property may be likened to the interest which a person may obtain in bees 
and birds, and fish in running streams, which are conspicuous instances of 
(animals) ferae naturae. If the claimant keeps them on his own premises they 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 55 
become his qualified property, and absolutely his so long as they do not escape. 
But if he permits them to go he can not follow them." Bristol v. E. L. A. 
Society, 52 Hun I6I, 5 N. Y. Supp. I3I, cited in the principal case. To the 
same effect are J. G. Wilso1i v. Ro1lsseau, 4 How. 646, 673; Gayler v. Wilder, IO 
How. 477; Morton v. N. Y. Eye blfirmary, 5 Blatch. n6; Dudley v. Mayhew, 
3 Comstock (N. Y.) 9; Comstock v. White, I8 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 42I. It 
was undoubtedly the purpose of the patent statutes to rectify this condition 
of the common law and it is quite probable that Stein might have patented 
his idea had it been new and· original with him even though it did not re-
quire physical devices for carrying it out. For a discussion of this point 
see IS Mic:e:. L. R.Ev. 660. 
RAU.ROADS-INJURY CAUSED BY F~ TO MuNICIPAI. FrnEMAN.-A public 
statute made a railroad liable for damages to person or property from fires 
set by its locomotives. Plaintiff, a city fireman, was injured in an attempt to 
extinguish a fire on X's property caused by defendant railroad. Held, that 
the act did not apply to the fireman, but only to those so situated that as to 
them the operation of the road constituted an extra fire hazard, and the rail-
road company violated no duty owed the fireman. Clark v. Boston & M. R. 
R. (N. H. I9I7), IOI Atl. 795. 
The statute does not apply in the case of property of a third person in the 
railroad's charge, but applies only to property in the control of others along 
its line. Welch et al. v. Concord R.R., 68 N. H. 2o6, 44 Atl. 304; Bassett v. 
Conn.· River R. Co., I45 Mass. I29. At common law a fireman injured 
through defects in the property is not entitled to recover, as he is considered · 
a licensee, and the owner owes him no active duty. Kelly v. Henry Muhs 
Co., 7I N. J. L. 358; Gibson v. Leonard, I43 Ill. I82, 32 N. E. 182. The 
proprietor must refrain from wilful or affirmative acts which are iniurious. 
Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Col. 3I6, no Pac. 203; Wood-
ruff v. Bowen, I36 Ind. 43I, 34 N. E. III3. Where a fireman called to put 
out a fire caused by an explosion resulting from defendant's locomotive neg-
ligently "kicking'' one of its cars, was injured by subsequent explosions, 
it was held that he could recover, such a situation being within the rule 
that a licensee has the right to require the proprietor to so conduct himself 
as not to injure another through his active negligence, for the subsequent 
explosion was a part of 'a series of events set in motion by the original act 
of the company. Houston Belt, &c. R. Co. v. O'Leary (Tex. Civ. App. I9II)~ 
136 S. W. 6o1; Bamett v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 87 N. J. L. 29, 93 Atl. 
Io8. The plaintiff could not recover in the instant case for his injury. He 
assumed the risk His attempt to extinguish the fire, and not the company's 
negligence, was the proximate cause of his injury. Seale v. Gi&lf C. & S. F. 
Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 274. 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT TO DEVISE-HARDSHIP ON INNOCENT 
THIRD P ART!Es.-On a promise to the plaintiffs' father that they should suc-
ceed to the promisor's property, the plaintiffs, when children, went to live 
with him. He was then childless, but thirty years later had a child by a 
second wife. To the wife and child, who knew nothing of the agreement~ 
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he conveyed the bulk of his property upon which the plaintiffs now seek to 
impose a constructive trust. Held, that specific performance should be de-
- nied. Sargent et al. v. Corey et al. (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App., 1917), 166 Pac. 
1021. 
Owens v. McNally (1896), II3 Cal. 444. 45 Pac. 710, 33 L. R. A. 369, 
seems here for the first time to have been followed in its basic principle-
the protection of the innocent w'idow of. the defaulting promisor. Stewart 
v. Smith (1907), 6 Cal. App. 152, 161, 91 Pac. 667, 671; 2 MICH. L. Rsv. 
235. Its doctrine appears even to have been broadened, in spite of the court's 
reasoning to the contrary, inasmuch as in the earlier case the court said the 
plaintiff had redress in a court of law. Here no such alternative is suggested, 
by the court and the nature of the case makes the recovery of any but 
nominal damages improbable. Facts giving rise to the same question seem 
to be found in only one other case, Dillon v. Gray (1912), 87 Kan. 129, 123 
Pac. 878. There Owens v. McNally was treated with respect, as it uni-
formly is, but the promisor's wife, though innocent, was not protected, be-
cause viewing the extraneous circumstances of the case, the judge thought 
the enforcement of the contract would not be "inequitable." The difficulty in 
finding any valid test for regulating the court's discretion in preventing hard-
ship to third parties is not new, nor are the California decisions unsupport-
able by dicta. Gall v. Gall, 64 Hun. 600, 19 N. Y. Supp. 332; POMEROY, SPE-
CIFIC. PERFORMANCS OF CONTRACTS (1879), § 181, citing Thomas v. Dering, I 
Keen 729; Curran v. Holyoke Water Co., n6 Mass. 90. The plaintiffs' sug-
gestion that the corpus be divided equally between the equally virtuous parties 
is refreshing, even though respect for the terms of the original contract for-
bade its adoption. 
TELEGRAPHS AND TuLEPHONES-DUTY TO FURNISH CHANGE . ....;....Plaintiff sued 
for damages resulting from a delay in the transmission of a message. The 
telegraph operator refused to accept the same because he could not change 
a five dollar bill tendered him by the plaintiff. Held, that a telegraph company 
must be prepared to furnish change to a reasonable amount to a person desir-
ing to send a telegram, the reasonableness with reference to the amount, time, 
and place to be judicially determined. Dale v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 740. 
The principal case cites no cases directly in point relating to telegraph 
companies and diligent search has revealed none; it was, however, thought 
that the case was governed by those principles relating to the duties of a 
public service corporation, analogous in this respect to a common carrier. 
The general rule is that a passenger, particularly one on a street car, is not 
bound to tender the exact fare, the courts differing only as to what is a 
reasonable sum out of which the company may be required to make change. 
!Yfaldowney v. Pittsburg & B. Traction Co., 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 335; Gillespie v. 
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 178 N. Y. 347; Wynn v. Georgia R. & Electric Co., 
6 Ga. App. 77; 64 S. E. 278; Funderburg v. Augusta & Aiken Ry. Co., 81 
S. C. 141, 61 S. E. 1075; Barrett v. Market St. Ry. Co., 81 Cal. 296, 6 L. 
R. A. 336; Barker v. Central Park N. & E. River Co., 151 N. Y. 237, 35 
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L. R. A. 489. The true rule is that the status of telegraph companies is 
analogous to common carriers in regard to their quasi-public character, and 
in their duty to serve the public generally in good faith, impartially, and with-
out discrimination. Central U. Tel. Co. v. Swoveland, I4 Ind. App. 34I, 42 N. 
E. Io35; Central U. Tel. Co. v. State, n8 Ind. I94. I9 N. E. 604, Io Am. St. 
Rep. n4 It is admitted that public sen•ice corporations owe a duty to furnish 
reasonable accommodations to the public. Narrett v. Market St. Ry., supra. 
The dissenting opinion in the principal case held that there was no reason 
for requiring a telegraph company to furnish change. It was argued that 
a passenger on a street railway naturally expects the conductor to have 
change, and that it would result in hardship to the passenger were the 
carrier not to owe a duty to furnish change. But it is readily seen that 
the s;ime arguments apply with even greater force to the case of a party 
desiring to send a telegram. Those in charge of a telegraph office have bet-
ter facilities for keeping money on hand and can more easily procure it if 
they find it necessary, than a conductor could while in charge of his car. 
One boarding a car has just as much opportunity to get the exact amount 
ready as has a person who sends a telegram. Jt seems that because of the 
duty as a publil:: service corporation to furnish reasonable accommodations, 
a telegraph company ought to be bound to furnish a reasonable amount of 
change to those desiring to send a telegram. 
ToRTS-INTtRFSSNCt WITH EMPLOYMtNT-RlGH'l' TO STRIKt.-Defend-
ant unions and their members, by agreement, ceased to work with the non-
union men of the plaintiff, the end in view being the strengthening of the 
union. Held, that this end was justifiable, there being no indication that 
the defendants' real purpose was to injure the plaintiff or the non-union 
men employed, such injury being a consequence of trade competition and 
an incident to a course of conduct by the defendants begun and prosecuted 
for their own legitimate interests. Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Brick-
layers', Masons' & Plasterers' Local Union No. I (Conn. I9I7), IOI Atl. 
659. 
It now seems well settled that a strike is not wrong per se. Mills v. 
U. S. Printing Co. of Olzio, 9I N. Y. Supp. 185, 99 App. Div. 6o5; Grassi 
Contracting Co. v. Be1111ett, I6o N. Y. Supp. 279; Wabash R. Co. v. Han-
11aha11, 121 Fed. 563; Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Michalek (III. l9I7), 
n6 N. E. 714; Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick (Mass. I917), n6 N. E. 
8o1. The present tendency of the authorities appears to support the state-
ment of the court in the instant case that where a strike is primarily 
for the betterment of the condition of the members of the unions it is 
justifiable, if not unlawful or opposed to public policy. Nat'l Protective 
Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; Grassi Contracting Co. 
v. Bennett, supra; Davis Mach. Co. v. Robinson, 84 N. Y. Supp. 837, 41 
Misc. Rep. 329; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; Cornellier 
v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Ass'1i, 221 Mass. 554, 109 N. E. 643; 
Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, supra; State v. Sfockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 
At!. 769; Kemp v. Division No. 24I, Amalgamated Association of Street 
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& Blee. Ry. Employees of America, 255 Ill. 2r3, 99 N. E. 389. But the 
troublesome question is to determine what is an unlawful strike, and upon 
this point the cases are not in harmony. It is generally agreed that a com-
bination contemplating the use of force, threats, or intimidation is unlawful. 
Minn. Stove Co. v. Cavanaugh, I3I Minn. 458, r55 N. W. 638; State v. 
Stockford, supra; Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, supra; P1wvis v. Local No. 
500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 2r4 Pa. 348, 63 At!. 585, 
u2 Am. St. Rep. 757. Likewise, a strike primarily for injury to others is 
unlawful. Grassi Contracting Co. v. Be1111ett, supra; Davis Mach. Co. v. 
Robinson, supra. On the other hand, it is held legitimate for a builders' 
association to write to an architect that its members will not bid on buildings 
if the bid of a certain person is received in competition. Master Builders' 
Ass'n v. Domascio, 16 Colo. App. 25, 63 Pac. 782. Several cases indicate that 
it is justifiable to strike for the purpose of enforcing a closed shop. Grassi 
Contracting Co. v. Bennett, supra; Garside v. Hollywood, ISO N. Y. Supp, 
647, 88 Misc. Rep. 3u; Jacobs v. Cohm, r83 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5, 2 L. R A. 
(N. S.) 292, III Am. St. R 730, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 280 (VANN, ]., dissent-
ing); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 At!. 230 (ap-
proved in Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 18r, 65 At!. 226; 
Gray v. Building Trades Council, 9r Minn. lJI, 97 N. W. 663; Kemp v. 
Division No. 241, supra (three justices dissenting); Roddy v. United Mine 
Wo1·kers of America, 4r Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126, L. R A. r915 D, 789. This 
theory is supported on the grounds that the securing of a closed shop is for 
the betterment and strengthening of the union, that a combination of in-
dividuals may do what one may do where the act is not illegal, and upon a 
broad view of the right of labor to combine. The Massachusetts court, 
on the contrary, declares (though not in any case turning directly upon this 
point), "that a strike instituted merely to compel a closed shop would not 
be justifiable on principles of competition, but would be unlawful." Cor-
nellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Ass'n, supra; Plant v. Woods, r76 
Mass. 492, 57 N. E. IOII; Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294. 84 N. E. 457; 
Snow Iron Wor.ks v. Chadwick, supra (semble). But that court has held 
lawful a strike to force au employer to employ union men for all of the 
work upon a particular building, Pic.kett v. Walsh, supra,-a holding that is 
hard to.distinguish in ultimate effect from that of permitting a strike to en-
force a closed shop. The position of the Connecticut court is somewhat 
doubtful as to the legality of a strike to enforce a closed shop. The opinion 
in Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 64r, 86 At!. 600, indicates a stand against 
the forcing of a closed shop. The instant case is not necessarily a de-
cision in favor of the opposite view, inasmuch as more than one-third of the 
men in the locality of the strike in all trades were non-union men, and, in 
the mind of the court, were a sufficiently large proportion to prevent the de-
fendant unions from exercising compulsion upon the employer. 
ToR'rs-N:EGI.IG:ENCE OF V:ENOOR_:_Plaintiff entered defendant's eating place, 
ordered a pfoce of cake, which had been baked and prepared by the de-
fendant, and, while eating same, bit upon a metallic nail concealed therein. 
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In an action of tort for damages suffered, held, defendant was not liable. 
Jacobs v. Childs Co. (1917), 166 N. Y. Supp. 798. ' 
As was said by the court in the principal case, an examination of the au-
thorities does not reveal any case involving the precise point contained above, 
but an examination of the facts and decision in the instant case would seem 
to indicate that the court overlooked a vital point, in reaching its conclusion. 
As authority for its decision, the court cites the case of Hasbrouck v. Armoflr 
& Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157; but the question involved in the in-
stant case was not present in the Wisconsin case at all. In the latter case, 
plaintiff, while washing her hands, was injured by a needle imbedded in the 
cake of toilet soap she was using, which soap she had purchased from a 
retail dealer, who had in tum purchased it from Armour & Co., manufac-
turer of the soap, from whom plaintiff sought damages. The court there 
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover from Armour & Co., on 
the ground of negligence, because there was no such privity between the 
parties as to give rise to any duty owed to plaintiff by the defendant, of 
which there had been a breach. In the principal case, however, there was a 
privity between the parties,-a privity of contract. The article sold to the 
plaintiff by the defendant was one which the latter had made itself, and the 
court seems to have overlooked that fact in its application of the doctrine 
of remoteness. It is true that the rule has been laid down that the vendor 
of an article not inherently dangerous in character is not liable to one, not 
a party to the contract of sale, who is injured because of defects in the 
dangerous construction of the article. See Bragdon v. Perkins-Campbell Co., 
87 Fed. 109, 30 U. S. C. C. A. 567; Salmon v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, u4 
Ill. App. 258; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865, 57 U. 
S. C. C. A. 237. That was the rule followed, and no doubt rightly followed, 
in the Armour case; but the presence of a privity of contract between the 
parties in the principal case would seem to give rise to a different question; 
viz., whether, due to the privity of contract between the parties, a duty was 
not created which was violated, and the breach of which gzve rise to a cause 
of action in tort. That question seems to have been entirely overlooked. 
WILLS-IRRJo.'VOCABLE.-A bill in chancery prayed that probate of a will be 
revoked and a later will admitted to probate. Held, on demurrer, that the 
suit should be dismissed on the ground that by probating the will the testator 
had renounced the right to make a later will, the probated will being in these 
words : "I do hereby bargain, sell and convey to my said husband all the 
property I now own or may acquire prior to my death, and agree that this 
is to take effect only in case of my death prior to that of my husband." Walker 
v. Yarbrough (Ala- 1917), 76 So. 390. 
In justification of this decision the court says in part: "It is therefore 
clear from these authorities that one may, for a valuable consideration paid to 
him, renounce his absolute power to dispose of his estate at pleasure. * * * 
But it must be conceded that the former instrument was binding in its con-
tractual feature, and that therefore the respondent should be entitled to re-
lief by way of cross-bill, and the contractual feature of the instrument en-
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forced by the establishment of a trust upon all the property owned by the 
testatrix at the time of her death. * * * The result therefore, would be that 
the court would sustain the contention of the complainants to set aside the 
will in favor of the respondent Walker, and in the same decree enforce the 
will by way of establishing a trust in favor of said Walker, upon the entire 
estate owned by her at the time of her death. We respectfully submit that 
this would be an anomalous situation in judicial procedure." McCLELLAN, 
J., dissented from the decision on the ground that the instrument was on 
its face merely contractual, and. under no circumstances entitled to probate. 
The first contention of the majority of the court that a man can for a 
valuable consideration renounce his power to make a will, is believed to 
be .absolutely unsupportable by authority. The right to alienate is an in-
separable incident of ownership. This doctrine has not been seriously dis-
puted since Mildmay's Case (I6o5), 6 Coke 40. The cases are reviewed in a 
note in i4 MICH. L. REV. (Feb., I9I6), p. 353. It is believed there is no case 
sustaining the contention that a person can by contract deprive himself of 
his legal right to make a will; but he certainly can by contract dispose of 
his property, both that then owned, and by way of estoppel that later to be 
acquired; so that when he later makes a will there will be no property for 
it to operate on. However, the question as to whether there is any property 
to pass by the will, what or how much, is not a question as to the validity of 
the probate. The peculi~rity of the instant case is that the contract made 
by the deceased, which contains no suggestion of the testamentary intention, 
had been admitted to probate as a will; and when the proponent of the 
later will sought to have that probate annulled, it was manifest to the court 
that to grant his prayer would secure him nothing and only lead to. useless 
litigation. , The decision seems entirely fostifiable on the ground that the 
court will not do a vain thing. 
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ACT-"PERSONAL INJURy''-OccuPATIONAL 
DISEASES.-X, an employee in a cigar factory, was incapacitated through 
neurosis which resulted from a bending "with shoulders forward,' so as to 
induce "pressure on the brachia! plexus," after being so employed twenty-
five years. The lower court granted compensation under the WORKMAN'S 
COMPENSATION ACT (St. 19II, c 75I, Mass.), and the insurer appealed. Held, 
that a disease which arises within the course of employment with nothing 
more is not within the ACT. fore Maggelet (Mass. I917), n6 N. E. 972. 
While the question decided in this case follows the rule laid down by 
the courts generally, it is of interest in showing the limitation which the 
Massachusetts court has placed upon its earlier decisions holding that cer-
tain occupational diseases were personal injuries within the meaning of the 
WoRKMAN's COMPENSATION ACT. See 14 MICH. L. REv. 525. In the prin-
cipal case the court says, "The words 'personal injury' in their connection 
in this statute do not naturally lend themselves to a situation such as that 
here disclosed. The ACT relates to industrial conditions * * * The Ac:r 
does not mention disease or occupational disease." In Hurle's Case, 2I7 
Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336, the same judge speaking for the court, said, "It 
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is significant that the element of accident was not intended to be imported 
into our Acc:r," and compensation was allowed a workman who had grad-
ually become blind through the effects of poisonous gas on the optic nerve. 
In Madam's Case, 222 Mass. 487, III N. E. 379, recovery under the Acc:r 
was allowed a woman who, through the exertion and strain of her employ-
ment, had so aggravated a pre-existing heart disease as to disable her, the 
court saying, "It was a definite and specific detriment to the physiological 
structure of her body." In Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735, 
recovery was had for an injury due to lead poisoning which had occurred 
gradually during the employee's occupation. In holding as it did the prin-
cipal case is neither illogical nor inconsistent, but merely limits the docttjne 
of the earlier cases. 
